The Bahá’í International Community’s
United Nations Office

The compliance of the Islamic Republic of Iran with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
as concerns the situation of the Bahá’ís

(February 2011)

We have noted that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has submitted its third periodic report on the implementation of the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The fact that Iran’s report makes not a single mention of the Bahá’ís is indicative of the government’s intractable attitude towards the country’s largest non-Muslim religious minority and evidence that its position is indefensible.

We would like to state categorically that the Bahá’í community in Iran is still deprived of many rights and liberties guaranteed by the Covenant. To document that fact, the following report will present human rights violations that have specifically targeted the Iranian Bahá’ís for decades, and illustrative cases from the past six years will be used as examples.

Additional information can be found at: http://bic.org/areas-of-work/persecution_bahai_community and through the following link, as well: http://news.bahai.org/human-rights/iran/iran-update/. The in-depth publication entitled The Bahá’í Question – Cultural Cleansing in Iran can be downloaded at: http://news.bahai.org/documentlibrary/TheBahaiQuestion.pdf or obtained in a bound edition from Bahá’í International Community representatives.

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Preface: specific provisions of the Covenant

Regarding Article 2 of the Covenant:

The method adopted by the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the subject of religion leads to a discriminatory interpretation. In Article 12, the Constitution establishes an official religion, Islam, and an official Shi’i denomination, Ja’fari Isna-Ashari, then names the Muslim denominations that are “granted full respect” and whose “followers are free to act in accordance with their own jurisprudence in performing their religious rites”. It is this kind of privileged treatment that the Covenant intends to eliminate.

In Article 13, the Constitution states that “Zoroastrians, Jewish and Christian Iranians are the only recognized religious minorities, who within the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and act according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious education”. The Constitution’s failure to include the Bahá’í Faith – founded in Iran – constitutes an egregious rejection of a significant portion of Iran’s population. By limiting freedom of religious practice to recognized religions only, the Constitution strips other religions of this freedom and legitimizes persecution in case of religious practice. Such a restrictive disposition goes far beyond discrimination, forbidding the Bahá’ís from practicing their religion.

Iran’s law on the rights of citizenship should include Bahá’í citizens and thereby extend some civil rights to them, but it has never been implemented regarding members of this community. Moreover, Article 14 of the Constitution would normally guarantee justice and respect for the human rights of non-Muslims. To avoid applying the provisions of this article to Bahá’ís, however, Iranian officials systematically accuse them of engaging in activities “against Islam and the Islamic Republic”.1

More information on historical, legal and constitutional matters is given in section 1, below.

Regarding Article 14 of the Covenant:

Article 34 of the Iranian Constitution provides that every person has the right “to litigate at competent courts”, but in practice most of the provisions of the Covenant’s Article 14 are violated in cases concerning Bahá’ís. Once again, this stems from the exclusion of Iranian Bahá’ís from recognition under the Constitution, which has deprived them of status under the law. As far as courts and tribunals are generally concerned, Bahá’ís are not equal to their fellow citizens of other religious persuasions.

Article 165 of the Iranian Constitution provides that “Trials shall be held in open sessions with the public admitted to attend, except when the court decides that open sessions would be contrary to public decency or order or when in private litigation the parties thereto request that trial sessions should not be held open.” In the case of the seven Bahá’í leaders who were put on trial this past year (see section 2, below), the judiciary repeatedly and adamantly resisted the appeals of the Bahá’ís and their attorneys for the trial to be held in open court.

1 Article 14 of the Constitution reads as follows: “In accordance with the sacred verse “God does not forbid you to deal kindly and justly with those who have not fought against you because of your religion and who have not expelled you from your homes” [60:8], the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and all Muslims are duty-bound to treat non-Muslims in conformity with ethical norms and the principles of Islamic justice and equity, and to respect their human rights. This principle applies to all who refrain from engaging in conspiracy or activity against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
At the same time, it violated the rules for closed hearings by allowing representatives of the Ministry of Information (i.e. Iran’s intelligence services, hereafter referred to as the Intelligence Ministry) and their camera crews to be present and to film the proceedings throughout the sessions.

The right of individuals to equality before the courts and tribunals is a vast subject involving many different aspects of the administration of justice, including discrimination in the interpretation and application of laws, based on and stemming from religious discrimination. Examples are given in sections 4, 5 and 6.

**Regarding Article 18 in conjunction with Article 27 of the Covenant:**

Violations committed against the Bahá’ís in Iran, for no reason other than their belief in the Bahá’í Faith, concern both individual and collective rights.

Neither the Iranian Constitution nor any other law explains the criteria followed in selecting the few religions that are “recognized”. We consider the current constitutional recognitions discriminatory and incompatible with provisions of the Covenant because they subject the individual’s rights and liberties to his/her adoption of a certain belief. In countries like Iran where matrimonial rights and obligations, inheritance and many other aspects of life are not governed by the same civil laws, recognized religious communities legislate, promulgate and administrate their own laws related to personal status. However, for those citizens who believe in religions not recognized by the Iranian Constitution, such as the Bahá’ís, civil status is never entirely clear or secure.

No religious community life is conceivable without a minimum degree of organization and administrative order. It is impossible for the largest non-Muslim religious minority in Iran to ignore the minimum vital needs of its community. This is particularly important as there is no clergy in the Bahá’í Faith. Bahá’í governing councils exist in over 180 countries and territories following the same basic administrative rules and assuming the same functions. Like its sister communities around the world, the Iranian Bahá’í community annually elected an administrative council (assembly) of nine members to look after its vital needs, until Iranian officials called for the Bahá’í administrative structure to be dismantled in August 1983, and consequently the National Spiritual Assembly of Iran dissolved itself and the rest of the administrative structure in the country as a demonstration of goodwill towards the government. Information on the current situation is provided in section 2.

**Regarding Article 20 of the Covenant:**

Some Iranian officials and members of the clergy openly advocate religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination and hostility against the Bahá’í Faith and its adherents, and do so with total impunity. National and provincial budgets include allocations for “educational” programmes to “confront” the Bahá’í Faith, and there are official organs dedicated to that purpose. Press, TV, radio, websites, pamphlets, posters and exhibitions vilify the Bahá’ís and their religion in campaigns sponsored or condoned by government officials. State-sanctioned media have distorted history and grossly maligned Bahá’í moral principles on innumerable occasions. Examples are given in section 9.

**Regarding Article 22 of the Covenant:**

Article 26 of the Iranian Constitution grants the right to freedom of association as follows: “Parties, associations, political groups and trade unions and Islamic or recognized religious minorities shall be free, provided they do not violate the principles of independence, liberty, national unity and Islamic standards and the foundation of the Islamic Republic”. Once again open to subjective interpretation, this provision allows the authorities to impose
restrictions on freedom of association far broader than those envisaged in the related article of the Covenant. For Bahá'ís, freedom of association does not exist because of the proviso that it applies only to “recognized religious minorities”.

**Regarding Article 26 of the Covenant:**

The requirement of the Covenant that “All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law” is reflected in Article 20 of the Iranian Constitution. It provides that “All persons... shall be equal under the protection of the law and shall enjoy all human, political, economic, social and cultural rights with due observance of the Islamic precepts”. However, the application of the proviso “with due observance of the Islamic precepts” has the effect of excluding the Bahá’í minority both from equality and protection before the law.

With respect to non-discrimination, Article 19 of the Iranian Constitution provides that: “The people of Iran belonging to whatever ethnic or tribal group shall enjoy equal rights and the complexion, race, language and the like shall not be considered as a privilege”. It is surely significant that no reference is made in this article to sex or religion, characteristics usually mentioned in this context in conjunction with language, race and colour, as is the case in Article 26 of the Covenant. In reality, the Iranian Constitution does not explicitly recognize the principle of religious non-discrimination. In practice, moreover, Bahá’ís do not enjoy equal rights and have been subjected to unfair and discriminatory treatment regarding the right to access to universities, business, employment, public services, cemeteries and places of worship. Examples are given in several of the following sections.

### 1. Situation of the Bahá’ís in Iran – historical and legal context

The Bahá’ís have been persecuted throughout the 165-year history of their Faith in Iran. Early followers faced violent opposition from both religious authorities and governing dynasties in Persia; some 20,000 perished in pogroms during the 19th century. The persecution continued intermittently thereafter, generally increasing when governments felt the need to appease fundamentalist Islamic leaders or curry their favour.

Some conservative members of the Islamic leadership view the Bahá’í Faith as a threat to Islam and brand Bahá’ís as apostates. The progressive ideas of the Faith on matters such as women's rights, the independent investigation of truth, and the absence of clergy are of concern to many fundamentalist Muslim clerics. In addition, for Iran's Shi'i establishment, the emergence of an independent religion that postdates the Qur'an is theologically abhorrent. Members of the Shi'i establishment in Iran have long been determined to extinguish the new faith and suppress its followers.

Following the Islamic Revolution, there was a sharp increase in the systematic, government-supported programme to eliminate the Bahá’í community as a viable entity in the country. This resulted in a parallel increase in the number, frequency and range of human rights violations against Bahá’ís. Since the early 1980s, over 200 have been executed or murdered, thousands arrested, detained, interrogated, and tens of thousands deprived of jobs, pensions and educational opportunities. The community’s holy places, cemeteries and property have been confiscated, vandalized or destroyed, and discrimination against members of this religion is official policy, as evidenced later in this report.

In international forums or in response to queries from other governments, Iran simply denies the existence of any discrimination, or its representatives blatantly lie – saying, for example,
that no Iranian is ever denied access to education on account of his or her religion, when there is incontrovertible written evidence instructing universities to expel anyone who is known to be a Bahá’í (see section 4.2, below). Iranian officials also say that if the government acts against the Bahá’ís, this is because they are committing crimes. The government is, however, unable to offer proof of any crime. Furthermore, if the Bahá’ís are guilty of crimes, why are their children targeted in school? Why are Bahá’í cemeteries destroyed? Why are Bahá’ís told that, if they will simply recant their Faith, they will be released from prison, free to attend university, able to keep their jobs and to receive all the protections afforded under Iran’s laws?

1.1 The government memorandum on “the Bahá’í question”

The official nature of the persecution came to light in 1993 with the publication, by the former UN Special Representative on Iran, of an Iranian government memorandum establishing a policy on “the Bahá’í question”. Drafted by the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council and approved by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (as well as by Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then President of Iran), the memorandum gave explicit instructions to ensure that the “progress and development” of the Bahá’í community “shall be blocked.” Its provisions, still in effect today, include directives denying access to higher education and to many kinds of employment for anyone known to be a Bahá’í.²

As we have often stated, the Bahá’í community poses no threat to the authorities in Iran. It is not aligned with any other government, ideology or opposition movement. The principles of the Faith require Bahá’ís to obey the laws of their country and to avoid partisan political involvement, subversive activity and all forms of violence.

The Bahá’ís seek no special privileges but only their rights under the International Bill of Human Rights (to which Iran is party), in particular the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to profess and practice their religion, and the rights to education and work.

1.2 Constitutional issues

Officials quote Articles 14³ and 20⁴ of the Iranian Constitution when claiming that all citizens “enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights”. As mentioned in the Preface, however, these constitutional provisions are not considered relevant in cases involving Bahá’ís, because they are restricted by Article 13 – which stipulates that Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians are the only recognized religious minorities. So when Iranian officials use the term “religious minorities”, they mean only those three.

² The text of the 1991 government memorandum can be accessed through the following links:
They are also attached to the printed copy of this submission as Annexes 1 and 2.

³ As already reported on page 2, above, Article 14 reads: “In accordance with the sacred verse “God does not forbid you to deal kindly and justly with those who have not fought against you because of your religion and who have not expelled you from your homes” [60:8], the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and all Muslims are duty-bound to treat non-Muslims in conformity with ethical norms and the principles of Islamic justice and equity, and to respect their human rights. This principle applies to all who refrain from engaging in conspiracy or activity against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

⁴ Article 20: “All citizens of the country, both men and women, equally enjoy the protection of the law and enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, in conformity with Islamic criteria.”
It naturally follows that official measures to promote the rights of “religious minorities” do not apply to Bahá’ís. For example, the Iranian parliament approved a bill in January 2003 granting equal compensation in “blood money” to the recognized religious minorities, but a court has since ruled that Bahá’ís cannot benefit from this legislation.

Finally, it should be noted that Article 23 of the Iranian Constitution reads as follows: “The investigation of individuals’ beliefs is forbidden, and no one may be molested or taken to task simply for holding a certain belief.” Nevertheless, the authorities have launched a vast information-gathering campaign over the past six years, specifically to identify and monitor the activities of all the Bahá’ís, as detailed in section 3, below.

In its third periodic report, the Iranian government uses the term “religious minorities” on numerous occasions and also refers to “religious societies”, but in all cases the authorities are using these terms to refer to only the recognized religions.

2. Denial of right to organize as a peaceful religious community

The Bahá’í Faith has no clergy. Its institutions perform many of the functions reserved to clergy in other religions and are the foundational element of Bahá’í community life. In other countries, these democratically elected governing councils organize and administer the religious activities of the community. In Iran, they have been banned since 1983.

As a result, Iranian Bahá’ís made arrangements to worship in small groups, hold classes for children, study and discuss their Faith, and take care of other community needs in their homes. The authorities have long attempted to prevent Iranian Bahá’ís from participating in their community’s religious gatherings, other group activities and events of Bahá’í community life. Beginning in 2004, officials intensified this pressure, with increased harassment and threats. They ordered the Bahá’ís to suspend social, educational and community-related activities – in other words, everything that went beyond the individual observance of religious obligations. For Bahá’ís, however, many of these activities are an integral part of their religious practice.

Moreover, every religious community must have some means, however informal, of administering its own affairs. Because they were not allowed to maintain their institutions, the Iranian Bahá’ís formed small, informal, ad hoc groups to organize the activities of the community and to serve its members at national and local levels. For years, the authorities knew about, monitored and tolerated the functioning of these groups. Early in 2009, however, the government declared all Bahá’í administrative arrangements illegal. According to a press release issued by Fars News on 15 February 2009, the declaration was made by Iran’s Prosecutor General, Ayatollah Qorban-Ali Dorri-Najafabadi, under whose direction (it was said) “the administrative element [of the Bahá’í community] will be confronted decisively until its complete destruction”. The same news was issued by IRNA and announced on national TV; internationally, it appeared on the websites of BBC Persian, Radio Farda and Radio Zamaneh. Following this announcement, the Bahá’ís once again agreed to demonstrate their goodwill to the government and voluntarily brought to a close the collective functioning of the informal administrative groups. In March 2009, the Bahá’í International Community issued an open letter to the Prosecutor General.  

5 For the Persian original, see http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8711271271; an English translation is attached to the printed copy of this submission as Annex 3.

6 A copy of the open letter is attached to the printed copy of this submission as Annex 4. It can also be found at: http://bic.org/areas-of-work/persecution/prosecutor-general-iran-en.pdf
By the time the government’s declaration appeared in the media, the seven former members of the national administrative group had been arbitrarily detained for nearly ten months. The names of these Bahá’í leaders are: Mrs. Fariba Kamalabadi, Mr. Jamaloddin Khanjani, Mr. Afif Naeimi, Mr. Saeid Rezaie, Mrs. Mahvash Sabet, Mr. Behrouz Tavakkoli, and Mr. Vahid Tizfahm. Their cases are the subject of Opinion No. 34/2008 issued by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. The Opinion was updated in the Working Group’s report to the Human Rights Council in 2010.

All seven were subjected to intensive interrogations and ill-treatment while in custody. Denied release on bail, they were detained in section 209 of Evin prison in Tehran for over two years. In his latest report to the UN General Assembly about Iran (dated 15 September 2010), the UN Secretary General devoted a section to the case of the Bahá’í leaders:

31. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights wrote to the authorities on several occasions to express concern and seek clarification about the status of the seven members of the Bahá’í community who had been detained since 14 May 2008 and whose trial began on 12 January 2010 for charges including “acting against national security, espionage and spreading corruption on earth”, which could entail the death penalty. The authorities also state they were responding to complaints from private individuals that they had been threatened or intimidated by an entity affiliated with the Bahá’í. The High Commissioner requested the authorities to allow independent monitoring of such high-profile trials, but this request was not granted. On 14 June 2010, the trial was concluded after three days of consecutive court appearances. At the time of writing the present report, there were unconfirmed reports that these seven members of the Bahá’í community would receive prison sentences of 20 years. The High Commissioner, through a number of letters, expressed deep concern that in the absence of any independent observers, these trials did not meet due process and fair trial requirements. The High Commissioner voiced grave concern that the criminal charges brought against the above-mentioned individuals appeared to constitute a violation of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular those of freedom of religion and belief and freedom of expression and association.

As mentioned above, the judiciary repeatedly and adamantly resisted the appeals of the seven Bahá’ís and their attorneys for the trial to be held in open court, while at the same time violating the rules for closed hearings by allowing intelligence officials and their camera crews to be present and to film the proceedings.

The verdict was handed down on 7 August 2010. The court found the defendants guilty of three charges pertaining to the role they had played, as members of the leadership group, in tending to the social and spiritual needs of Iran's Bahá'ís. The seven former leaders were also found guilty of three charges alleging that they had engaged in activities aimed at undermining the security of the State. The maximum penalty was imposed, 20 years in prison. Regarding the other charges, tarnishing the reputation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the international arena and "spreading corruption on earth", the court concluded that there was no evidence to establish a finding of guilt.

7 Mrs. Sabet had been arrested on 5 March 2008 while in Mashhad and later transferred to Tehran; the six others had been arrested on 14 May 2008 at their homes in Tehran.

8 The relevant extract from the Working Group’s report to the Human Rights Council in March 2010 is attached to the printed copy of this submission as Annex 5. The full text of the Working Group’s report can be found at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A-HRC-13-30-Add1.pdf.
On 25 August 2010, the lawyers representing the Baha'is submitted an appeal detailing the flagrant procedural errors that had characterized the judicial proceedings and the spurious nature of the accusations in the indictment. On 12 September, the appeals court ruled that there was no foundation to the charges related to undermining national security, and accordingly overturned the ten-year sentence for those alleged offences. However, the appeals court upheld the original verdict on the charges related to the services rendered by the seven Baha'is as members of the leadership group, and thus confirmed the 10-year sentence handed down on those grounds.

Throughout the judicial process, the authorities distorted and misrepresented the religious beliefs of the seven former leaders and their service to the Baha'i community. They were declared guilty of "crimes" merely for having manifested their religion "in community with others and in public or private", "in worship, observance, practice and teaching" – in other words, for having exercised their right to freedom of religion or belief as stipulated in Article 18 of the ICCPR.

Within days of the original verdict, the prisoners were transferred to Gohardasht (also known as Rajaishahr) prison, notorious for its brutally harsh conditions. This prison is in Karaj, outside their home province of Tehran, meaning that they have effectively been placed in internal exile, in contravention of Iran's statutes governing the transfer of prison inmates. They are being forced to endure appalling filth, pestilence, and quarters so cramped that it is difficult for them to lie down or even to perform their daily prayers. It should be recalled that they were detained in section 209 of Evin prison for well over two years under harsh conditions that had a detrimental effect on their health. At Gohardasht prison they have no access to adequate medical treatment. In mid-February 2011, they were transferred to particularly brutal sections of the prison, and one of the women has since been physically threatened by a large group of inmates (see http://news.bahai.org/story/807).

In addition, the judiciary has not yet formalized the verdicts: no written copies have been issued by the court, neither of the original verdict, nor of the decision on appeal. The defence lawyers were only given an opportunity to make a handwritten transcript, which does not allow them to take the steps required to obtain either release on bail (pending further appeal) or the temporary leave that can be granted to sentenced prisoners in Iran for compassionate reasons. The prison authorities are refusing to consider any such request because they claim that they, too, have never been given the verdict, and thus the Bahá'í prisoners are still classified as being in "temporary" detention and ineligible for compassionate leave. The judicial authorities have not formally used the term "temporary" detention since the conclusion of the trial and have made no public statements about the sentencing and appeal.

Due process is thus again being denied during the post-trial period.

3. **Denial of the right to life, liberty and security of person**

A national effort to identify and monitor members of the Bahá'í community throughout Iran began towards the end of 2005, and official acts of persecution and discrimination have greatly increased since then.

In March 2006, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief expressed her grave concern about a "confidential letter sent on 29 October 2005 by the Chairman of the
Command Headquarters of the Armed Forces in Iran”.⁹ It had been addressed to the Ministry of Information, the Commanders of the Revolutionary Guard, Basij, Police, Army and others, copied to the Head of the Judiciary and to the Chairman of the Office of the Supreme Leader. Signed by Basij Major General Seyyed Hossein Firuzabadi, the letter refers to “the misguided sects of Bahaiism and Babism” and states that “according to the instructions of [Iran’s] Supreme Leader”:

“…the Command Headquarters of the Armed Forces has been given the mission to acquire a comprehensive and complete report of all the activities of these sects (including political, economic, social and cultural) for the purpose of identifying all the individuals of these misguided sects. Therefore, we request that you convey to relevant authorities to, in a highly confidential manner, collect any and all information about the above-mentioned activities of these individuals and report it to this Command Headquarters.”

Towards the end of July, Amnesty International issued a statement about the letter and provided the opportunity to obtain a copy.

We later heard about governmental implementation orders sent out in 2006. For example, the Ministry of the Interior wrote in August that year to the provincial deputies of the Department of Politics and Security in Offices of the Governors’ General throughout Iran. These officials were instructed to complete a questionnaire about local Bahá’ís and to order “relevant offices to cautiously and sensitively monitor and supervise” all Bahá’í social/educational activities. Detailed information was sought: places of residence, occupations, education, names of all the members of each family, how they related to their Muslim neighbours and colleagues, and so on.¹⁰

From 2006 to the present day, police and Intelligence Ministry officials have interrogated hundreds of Bahá’ís in over 20 cities and towns. Some came to Bahá’í homes and workplaces; others summoned them to come in for questioning. Bahá’ís known to the Ministry were harassed to give information about others. Attempts were also made to obtain information through surreptitious means, by people posing as journalists or questioning children in the street. Moreover, officials came to the homes of non-Bahá’í neighbours, seeking information and asking them to monitor the Bahá’ís next door.

Once they had been identified, Bahá’ís and some of their non-Bahá’i friends of all ages (including children, adolescents and military trainees) were subjected to physical assaults, harassment and intimidation, as detailed in the following section.

Of course, other groups have also suffered during the same period. The authorities have cracked down on civil society, as well, targeting academics, women’s rights and trade union activists, students, journalists, and participants in peaceful demonstrations. The repression increased during the year that followed the Presidential elections, and the Bahá’ís were falsely accused of being among the groups responsible for the civil unrest and turmoil. Human rights defenders have been particularly hard hit since then, as the authorities are also attempting to silence anyone who reports human rights violations to the international community, including any Bahá’ís who do so.

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⁹ The text of the letter (in both the original Persian and English translation) can be accessed through the following page: [http://www.bahaiworldnews.org/story/473](http://www.bahaiworldnews.org/story/473) These documents are also attached to the printed copy of this submission as Annexes 6 and 7.

¹⁰ To read the English translation of the August 2006 letter, see Annex 8 (attached to the printed copy of this submission) or [click here](http://www.bahaiworldnews.org/story/473). To view the original letter in Persian, see Annex 9 (attached to the printed copy) or [click here](http://www.bahaiworldnews.org/story/473).
3.1 Violent attacks

The Bahá'í International Community was outraged to hear about the death of Mr. Dhabihu'llah Mahrami in his prison cell in December 2005.\(^{11}\) This occurred at a time when a major media campaign had begun, vilifying the Bahá'í Faith and its adherents. There had already been some physical violence, including a serious outbreak in early 2005 in Yazd – the city where Mr. Mahrami was imprisoned – during which unknown individuals severely injured two Bahá'ís, set a shop on fire (destroying all the merchandise), and demolished the Bahá'í cemetery, smashing the tombstones and leaving the remains of the interred exposed.

Attacks later occurred in other localities, as well, and Bahá'ís faced harassment and intimidation from officials, anonymous callers and plainclothes agents. Some received death threats, were physically assaulted or evicted from their homes. Bahá'í cemeteries, homes and vehicles, farms, orchards, shops and other workplaces were attacked, damaged, defaced with graffiti.\(^{12}\) Incidents involving arson often occurred in series targeting a number of Bahá'ís in the same town. In 2008 and 2009, this kind of violence was aimed at Bahá'ís in Rafsanjan and Karaj, and a dozen attacks since October 2010 once again targeted Bahá'í shops in Rafsanjan (see [http://news.bahai.org/story/805](http://news.bahai.org/story/805)).

In Semnan, after a series of arrests and house searches in December 2008 had clearly identified local Bahá'ís, repeated attacks in 2009 and 2010 targeted homes, shops and vehicles belonging to them and their relatives. Other events also strongly suggest an organized campaign, intended to compel all known Bahá'ís to leave Semnan, in particular incendiary sermons preached by the local clergy and a series of anti-Bahá'í public seminars and rallies in the weeks prior to the first violent attacks, at which the citizenry was urged not to associate with Bahá'ís, to refuse to conduct business with them, and to expel them from the city.

A similar approach has been taken against Bahá'ís elsewhere, with the city of Sari and the village of Ivel figuring prominently in this effort. Most recently, in Ivel, some 50 homes belonging to Bahá'ís were razed. There have also been signs of intent to drive the Bahá'ís out of Abadeh, Aligudarz, Bukan, Khorramabad, Laljin, Parsabad and Ravansar, as well as Asfin and Gaziran in the suburbs of Arak.

It is very difficult for members of the community to obtain recourse in such cases, as the police do not investigate or do not seem able to find the perpetrators. Even when informed in advance of an impending attack against Bahá'ís or their properties, the police offer no protection. The attacks are condoned by religious authorities and committed with total impunity.

Officials tend to say that the Iranian people consider Bahá'ís as infidels and wish to attack them. On the contrary, it has been the experience of the Iranian Bahá'í community that many of their fellow countrymen respect and admire Bahá'ís for their ideals, good character and steadfastness. Negative attitudes are much more often expressed and fostered by Islamic leaders and government officials.

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\(^{11}\) In the mid-1990s, Mr. Mahrami faced trial solely on the grounds of being an "apostate" for believing in the Bahá'í Faith, and he received a death sentence, commuted in 1999 to life imprisonment. He was 59 years old.

\(^{12}\) Photos documenting some of these attacks are being provided as separate annexes to the printed copy of this submission and can also be found at: [http://news.bahai.org/story/645](http://news.bahai.org/story/645).
3.2 Arbitrary arrests and imprisonments

To put recent events in context, it should be noted that there were five Bahá'í prisoners in Iranian prisons in 2001, four in 2002-2003, and only two were arrested in 2004. Then the persecution began to intensify again. From August 2004 to the present day, there have been 363 arrests (see table below). In addition, it should be recalled that the police and intelligence services have summoned many hundreds more for interrogation without officially arresting or detaining them: 196 such cases were reported in just one year (2007).

Cumulative figures:
Bahá'ís arrested from August 2004 to 20 December 2010

- 363 Bahá'ís have been arrested since August 2004
- **69** are currently in prison
  - 133 have been released on bail and are awaiting trial
  - 19 have been released without having to post bail
  - 96 have been tried and sentenced and are free pending appeal or official summons to begin serving their sentences
  - 27 have been tried, sentenced, and have completed their prison terms
  - 14 have had their charges cleared or verdicts overturned on appeal
  - 5 have served out their prison sentences and begun additional terms of exile

Bahá'ís have been arrested in localities throughout the country. Recently, however, more of those detained have been held in section 209 of Evin prison in Tehran – a section reportedly controlled by the Intelligence Ministry – where detainees are sometimes kept in solitary confinement and interrogated for months without charge.

Among those taken into custody and interrogated (in some cases repeatedly), many are former members of the ad hoc administrative groups that used to coordinate the social, educational and other community activities of Bahá'ís in various towns. Most were detained for weeks or even months before being released on bail. Bail demands have been very high, requiring families to hand over deeds to property, business or work licences. In nearly all cases, the homes and/or places of business of the detainees have been searched and personal belongings confiscated, in particular books, photos and materials related to the Bahá'í Faith, copying machines, computers and supplies.

Bahá'ís in certain localities have been disproportionately affected by the crackdown since 2005. In Semnan and Shiraz, the number of imprisonments has been particularly high, and some have involved ill treatment while in custody. In May 2006, authorities in Shiraz arrested 54 young Bahá'ís who had been engaged (together with some of their Muslim friends) in an educational programme for underprivileged children. One was cleared and released the same day, 50 were arbitrarily detained for five or six days, and three for one month. In August 2007, the entire group was charged with “indirect teaching” of the Bahá’í Faith, despite statements signed by Muslim participants attesting that they had been unaware of any such “teaching”, and despite the court’s acknowledgement that the “teaching” materials contained no mention of the Bahá’í Faith. Subsequently:

- Three of the accused were sentenced to four years of imprisonment. Ms. Haleh Roohi, Ms. Raha Sabet and Mr. Sasan Taqva were held for over three years in the Intelligence Ministry’s detention centre in Shiraz, even though the Ministry does not have the right to imprison citizens under Iranian law (only to detain them for interrogation). The conditions there are very harsh, totally unacceptable for long-term imprisonment. It seems that two of them recently obtained early release, but the situation of the third is not yet clear.
The 50 others were sentenced to one year in prison, suspended if they attended classes organized by the Islamic Propaganda Organization.

A report in 2008 by an Iranian official who had looked into the case, and whose findings confirmed the innocence of all 53 Bahá’ís, was at first ignored by the authorities. After the document became known, however, the official was obliged to write another account, rejecting the conclusions of his original report.

Government officials sometimes cite Iran’s own laws and regulations to prove that their legal system is consistent with international standards, but many provisions of national legislation are ignored when intelligence officers arrest and detain Bahá’ís, and also when cases against adherents of this religion are brought to trial. In nearly all cases against Bahá’ís, Iran’s intelligence services and its judiciary fail to act in accordance with due process.

However, responding to pressure from the international community, the Iranian authorities have not sentenced any members of the Bahá’í community to death or to life imprisonment in recent years. Recent sentences have ranged from a few months to 20 years, and some have been condemned to additional time in internal exile.

Details about individual cases have been presented in our UPDATE documents, available at http://bic.org/areas-of-work/persecution/bic-documents#updates.

A complete list of currently active cases is attached to this report.13

4. Denial of access to education

4.1 Elementary and secondary schools

We find it intolerable that Bahá’í children and adolescents are being subjected to harassment, vilification and severe psychological pressure in primary, middle and high schools throughout Iran – and these abuses are being committed by those who should hold their trust: their teachers and school administrators.

Many students have been threatened with expulsion or forced to change schools. Some were pressured to convert to Islam, told they are apostates, or obliged to use authorized textbooks that denigrate and falsify their religious heritage. Many were singled out or called to the front of the classroom as their Faith was vilified, and all those who dared to respond were severely reprimanded. The extent and remarkably similar nature of the cruel abuses make it clear that this is an organized effort. In only two months, January/February 2007, over 150 incidents were reported from ten different cities. That same year, the Ministry of Education introduced a new high school registration form with a section on religion (some teachers strongly urged Bahá’í students not to declare their religion on this form). Widespread mistreatment has continued ever since. From October 2008 to February 2009, we received reports of well over 100 incidents in a dozen different localities.

In parallel, schoolteachers were being “educated” about the Bahá’í Faith. The materials provided for them perpetuate the same falsifications that have been disseminated since the early days of the Bahá’í Faith in Iran and are remarkably similar to defamatory propaganda in the media (described in section 9, below).

13 In the print copy, this document is provided as Annex 10.
For at least four years, anti-Bahá’í leaflets have been distributed in schools in different cities, and efforts have been made through the school system to identify Bahá’í students of all ages and the members of their families. For example, a form circulated by the Education Department Management Security Office in Shiraz was to be completed for all students “who belong to religious minorities and the perversive Bahá’í sect”. The form required information not only about the student and his/her parents, but also about all of the student’s siblings. The entry for Religion listed only four options: “Christian”, “Jew”, “Zoroastrian”, and “Perverse Bahá’í sect”.

4.2 Higher education

Members of the Bahá’í Faith continue to be denied access to higher education. It is an official policy of the government to expel Bahá’ís from universities and vocational training institutions, as soon as they are identified as adherents of this religion. All the Bahá’í students who have appealed against their expulsions with relevant authorities, and/or through the courts, have seen their cases rejected and dismissed.

The authorities are well aware of the fact that Bahá’ís, as a matter of principle, will not deny or lie about their religious affiliation. In 2004 and 2005, the government responded to international pressure by asserting that the purpose of the required space marked “religion” on the application form for the national university entrance examination was not, in fact, to identify the applicant’s religion but rather to indicate the course of religious study that the applicant had chosen. On the basis of that assurance, Bahá’ís finally were able to take the national university entrance exam without having to declare their religious affiliation. Over 800 Bahá’ís did so for academic year 2006-2007; 480 passed the exam; 289 were admitted. One by one, those who began their studies were identified as Bahá’ís and expelled at different stages, sometimes in the final weeks of a term of study: over 160 had been expelled by January 2007.

Several official documents indicate that the expulsions constitute official policy. Chief among these is a communication from the Central Security Office of the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, sent in 2006 (the month and day are illegible on the available copy). Addressed to 81 Iranian universities, the names of which were listed, the letter explicitly instructed them to expel any student discovered to be a Bahá’í, at the time of enrolment or during his/her studies. To enrol, students are required to fill out forms that include a declaration of religion, and during the academic year university authorities sometimes also ask students to identify their religion. Whenever it has been discovered that a student is a Bahá’í, he or she has been expelled.

The 2006 letter stated that the instructions were being promulgated under the provisions of “decree number 1327/M/S, dated 6/12/69 [25 February 1991]”. This refers to the 1991 memorandum mentioned earlier – among its provisions was the directive: “They [Bahá’ís] must be expelled from universities, either in the admission process or during the course of their studies, once it becomes known that they are Bahá’ís".

14 This document is provided in attachment to the printed copy of this submission, in the original Persian and in English translation, see Annexes 11 and 12.

15 In Iran, the national entrance exam includes a section testing knowledge of one religion. Each applicant chooses the religion about which he or she wishes to be tested, but there are only four options, corresponding to the four recognized religions.

16 For the 2006 letter to universities, see Annexes 13 and 14 (attached to the printed copy of this submission) or click on the following links:
Persian: http://news.bahai.org/documentlibrary/575/1_LetterFromMinistriesToUniversities.pdf
English: http://news.bahai.org/documentlibrary/575/1_LetterFromMinistriesToUniversities_en.pdf
Another official letter, from the Central Security Office of Payame Noor University\(^\text{17}\) to its regional branches (dated 2 November 2006), stipulated that:

“...according to the ruling of the Cultural Revolutionary Council and the instructions of the Ministry of Information and the Head Protection Office of the Central Organization of Payame Noor University, Bahá’ís cannot enrol in universities and higher education centres. Therefore, such cases if encountered should be reported, their enrolment should be strictly avoided, and if they are already enrolled they should be expelled.”\(^\text{18}\)

A related document (dated 17 March 2007) indicated that the security office of one branch had implemented the instructions. The office directed the President of that branch to “give the necessary instructions to prevent the enrolment of the Bahá’í applicants” and to “have the names of such applicants submitted to this office for its use.”\(^\text{19}\)

The government has since done nothing to reverse or counter these instructions, which were implemented throughout the country. For academic year 2007-2008:

- The application form for technical and vocational institutes, which had to be filled out to take the entrance exam in these fields, included a declaration of religion that excluded Bahá’ís.
- Over 1,000 Bahá’í students took the exam for other fields in June 2007. About 800 of them were later informed that their exam papers would not be graded, and the reason given in all cases was “incomplete file”.
- Only 237 of those who took the exam were informed that their marks were satisfactory and they could apply for admittance. Fewer still – 121 – were allowed to select their field of study and admitted to universities. By January 2008, over 40 had not been allowed to register or had been identified as Bahá’ís at some later stage and expelled.

Meanwhile, all the official efforts to identify members of the community had generated a simpler way to seal off access to university for those now known to be Bahá’ís. Students who took the entrance exam for academic year 2008-2009 were instructed to go to a website to obtain their results. All those who had previously been identified as Bahá’ís were diverted to a page with the following URL (note the final word):


where they received the message: "Error: 'Incomplete File. Forward correspondence to the Education Assessment Organization c/o P.O. Box 31535-3166, Karaj'."

Many students have written, appealed, used every available means of recourse, but not a single case has been decided in favour of a Bahá’í. On the contrary, a number of court cases have upheld the government’s discriminatory policy. Meanwhile, expulsions continue.

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\(^{17}\) According to its website, Payame Noor is “a state distance-education university with Headquarters based in Tehran, 10 Regional Centers, 130 Study Centers, 126 Study Units throughout the country and 1 Overseas Center.” Dozens of Bahá’ís students have been expelled from Payame Noor.

\(^{18}\) The 2 November 2006 letter is attached to the printed copy of this submission (see Annexes 15 and 16) and can also be accessed at:


\(^{19}\) The letter dated 17 March 2007 is provided in attachment to the printed copy of this submission (see Annexes 17 and 18) and can also be found at:


We cannot but conclude that the authorities never intended to take the measures required to reverse long-standing policies that continue to block access to higher education for those identified as Bahá’ís. Enrolling a token number (only to dismiss them at a later date) is clearly a tactic to deceive the international community, and officials have been using the process as yet another means of identifying adherents of the Bahá’í Faith.

Since the late 1980s, members of the community arranged to offer classes in private homes, with a number of specialized classrooms, laboratories and libraries scattered throughout the country. This is referred to as the Bahá’í Institute of Higher Education (BIHE).

Being denied access to university-level studies is a deplorable abuse of human rights, as it seeks to demoralize and impoverish those who would otherwise be in a position to make significant contributions to the advancement of their societies. Further information on this issue can be found through the following links: http://denial.bahai.org/index.php and http://www.bahai.org/persecution/iran.

Finally, as you may know, a report entitled Punishing Stars: Systematic Discrimination and Exclusion in Iranian Higher Education was recently published by the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran. Issued on 7 December 2010, the 77-page document focuses on denial of access to higher education based on political or religious beliefs. One section is entirely devoted to the Bahá’ís, and another presents cases where Bahá’í and other students speak about their attempts to obtain recourse. The full text can be downloaded in PDF at: http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2010/12/punishing-stars-dec2010/

5. Confiscation and destruction of community property

Bahá’í holy places, historical sites, administrative centres and other assets were seized after the 1979 revolution. In March 1979, the government turned over the House of the Báb, the holiest Bahá’í shrine in Iran, to a Muslim cleric known for his anti-Bahá’í activities. In September that year, the house was destroyed by a mob led by mullahs and officials of the Department of Religious Affairs.

No community properties have been returned, and many have been destroyed. The seizure of cemeteries was particularly cruel, as many Bahá’ís were given access only to areas of wasteland for this purpose. In certain cities, members of the community do not receive permission for burials at all. Since 2005, there have been severe attacks, often repeated, against Bahá’í cemeteries in 24 different localities. The destruction of the cemetery in Yazd in 2005 has already been mentioned above. In 2008, a cemetery near Ghaemshahr was attacked three times, and the graves repeatedly desecrated; officials returned to the same cemetery on 19 January 2009 and razed it. In yet another incident, the body in a grave in the Bahá’í cemetery in Abadeh was exhumed and crushed under the wheels of a vehicle. Virtually every Bahá’í cemetery in the country has been vandalized or desecrated, and at least two were fully demolished.

In January 2004 a sacred site in Babul was destroyed that had great religious significance to all Bahá’ís: the resting place of Mulla Muhammad-’Ali Barfurushi, known as Quddus. The destruction was carried out with full cooperation from the authorities, despite appeals by

20 Photos documenting some of the attacks are attached to the print copy of this submission.

21 In 1849, Islamic religious leaders killed Quddus (the most holy), the foremost apostle of the Prophet-Herald of the Faith, for refusing to recant his beliefs. His resting place was among the many historic and holy places confiscated by the Iranian authorities during the Islamic Revolution.
local Bahá’ís, who were even prevented from retrieving the sacred remains. In June that year, another holy place was demolished, a house in Tehran related to an important period in the history of the Bahá’í Faith.

6. *Confiscation of property belonging to individual Bahá’ís*

The property rights of individual Bahá’ís are generally disregarded in Iran. Since 1979, officials have confiscated a large number of private and business properties, homes, farms and shops belonging to Bahá’ís throughout the country. Some cases were taken to court, but the judgements demonstrated that the authorities continue to consider the Bahá’í Faith as an illegal movement and to legitimise human rights violations against Iranian citizens who are members of the community. This was fully documented in the report submitted to the Human Rights Council by the UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing in 2006, after his country visit to Iran (see E/CN.4/2006/41/Add.2).

Since 2005, there has been a marked increase in the number of summary searches of Bahá’í homes during which personal belongings have been seized. Most Bahá’ís taken into custody have had their homes raided at the time of the arrest. Computers, mobile phones, books, photos, documents (including deeds and business licenses), printed material and possessions related in any way to Bahá’í activities are routinely confiscated during these searches.

7. *Denial of employment, pensions and other benefits*

The Iranian government has been carrying out a well organized and widespread scheme to deny Bahá’ís the right to employment. In hundreds of cases over the past six years, officials have taken measures to make it impossible for Bahá’ís to earn a living, following the implementation of government orders to identify all members of the community (described in section 3, above). Official documents prove that these abuses are government policy.

One of these documents is a letter dated 9 April 2007, in which the Public Places Supervision Office (Province of Tehran) gave orders to the commanders of police and heads of public intelligence and security throughout its region. The letter specified restrictions to prevent members of the “perverse Bahaist sect” (as well as members of anti-revolutionary political organizations and other illegal groups) from engaging in certain occupations. The orders stipulated that Bahá’ís are to be denied work permits or licences for over 25 kinds of business, specifically listed, and also to be barred from all “high-earning businesses”.  

Furthermore, a form is to be filled out and signed by all who apply for business licences, requiring the applicant to declare his/her religion and undertake to:

…adhere to and uphold the moral principle of the law and regulations of the Public Places Supervision Office and the laws and authority of the Islamic Revolution… [and accede that] …in the case of the slightest wrongdoing, the [same] Office has the authority to impede my

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22 A copy of this April 2007 letter (in Persian original and English translation) can be found on pages 86-87 of The Bahá’í Question – Cultural Cleansing in Iran, which can be downloaded in electronic form at: http://news.bahai.org/human-rights/iran/the-bahai-question.html or obtained in a bound edition from Bahá’í International Community representatives. Both language versions are attached to the printed copy of this submission, see Annexes 19 and 20.
activity without adhering to any legal or administrative proceedings, and I, consequently, do not have grounds for any objections.

In this manner, the authorities are attempting to deny legal recourse to those targeted by the discriminatory regulations.

Nationwide efforts to identify all members of the Bahá’í community, beginning in 2004-2005, have been detailed above. In 2006 it was reported that the Iranian Association of Chambers of Commerce (Ettehadiyeye Asnaf) was compiling a list of Bahá’ís in every trade and employment, and that other trade associations and unions had been instructed to do so, as well. Identification was followed by action, involving an untold number of officials who:

- closed Bahá’í-owned businesses, refused to issue or renew business licenses, work permits and/or trade membership cards for Bahá’ís in a wide range of sectors
- warned private-sector employers against hiring Bahá’ís and/or harassed them to dismiss Bahá’i employees, threatening them with closure of their business if they did not do so – some were shut down; others banned from advertising, etc.
- issued instructions to chain stores, government offices and other organizations to avoid purchasing from (or stop all business dealings with) companies and independents because the owners or managers were Bahá’ís
- incited the population to shun Bahá’í-owned businesses
- asked landlords of stores to refuse lease renewals to Bahá’í tenant shopkeepers
- banned Bahá’ís who were working independently from continuing their activities
- conducted unexpected inspection visits to workplaces, summoning and interrogating Bahá’ís, raiding and even vandalizing Bahá’í-owned stores

The systematic nature of this effort can be seen from the fact that, during 2007, such abuses occurred in 41 different localities. One official informed the Bahá’í owner of a store in Hamedan (operated by his family for 48 years) that licenses for grocery stores would no longer be issued to Bahá’ís, and the owner requested confirmation in writing. The official replied, “Wherever you go, even to the United Nations, you will end up here, where you will get the same clear answer.” If the Bahá’í wanted the license, the official added, he could change his religion.

Banks have refused to proceed with loan approvals and/or frozen assets in accounts belonging to Bahá’ís. Business licenses and banking services are vital, as many Bahá’ís launched private enterprises because they and other members of the community could not obtain employment in Iran. In the 1980s, over 10,000 Bahá’ís were dismissed from positions in government and educational institutions, and never received unemployment benefits. Pensions were terminated, as well. Some of those deprived of their rightfully earned pensions attempted to pursue legal remedies, but the courts have systematically ruled against them. Copies of court decisions in such cases explicitly state: "payment of pension to those individuals connected with the baha’i sect is illegal" [or an "unlawful act"].

Bahá’í farmers are also affected. Agricultural land owned by members of the community has been destroyed; trees have been uprooted in Bahá’í-owned orchards; and a Bahá’í was recently forced to close down his dairy farm.

The intergovernmental body most concerned with the right to employment is the International Labour Organization (ILO). Its Committee of Experts has repeatedly referred to the Iranian Bahá’ís in its reports, expressing concern about ongoing discrimination in Iran against “members of unrecognized religions, in particular the members of the Baha’i faith”.

In 2006 Iran was up for scrutiny with regard to ILO Convention 111 on Discrimination. In Plenary at the Conference that year, statements about discrimination on the basis of religion in Iran focused almost entirely on the Bahá’ís, and the relevant extract in the Provisional
The recurrent, extensive violations against Bahá’ís in the areas of employment and vocational education – and the fact that the government had taken no measures to comply with ILO recommendations in this regard – were again evoked at the Conferences in 2008 and 2009. In its 2010 report, the Committee of Experts stated:

“...Bahá’í continued to be subjected to discrimination as regards access to education and employment without any significant measures being taken by the Government to bring discriminatory practices, including on the part of the authorities, to an end.”

8. Denial of civil rights and liberties

Bahá’ís have no legal protection in Iran and thus their civil rights can be ignored with impunity. In nearly all routine civil procedures for which a form must be filled out, Iranian citizens must identify their religious affiliation.

The freedom of Bahá’ís to travel outside or inside Iran is often impeded and sometimes denied. Bahá’ís have had their passports confiscated when attempting to travel abroad, and some (in particular those formerly involved in coordinating community activities) have been placed on “no fly” lists. More Bahá’ís have been given passports in recent years, but there has been no official change of policy. Bahá’ís abroad still find some Iranian embassy officials uncooperative. Requiring applicants to declare affiliation with a “recognized” religion on passport application forms has been used to pressure Bahá’ís to recant their beliefs.

Official measures taken in 2000 enabled married Bahá’í couples to register as husband and wife and to register their children, but the law was not changed, so Bahá’í marriages and divorces are still not legally recognized. The right of Bahá’ís to inherit is denied.

9. Incitement to hatred based on religion or belief

The upsurge in human rights violations against Bahá’ís over the past six years was preceded and accompanied by efforts to incite hatred against them. Some officials openly encourage the persecution, and some members of the clergy preach sermons against the Bahá’í Faith and its adherents. National and provincial budgets include allocations for “educational” programmes to “confront” the Bahá’í Faith, and there are official organs dedicated to that purpose. This is incitement to hatred, institutionalized.

Articles, TV and radio programmes, government-affiliated websites, pamphlets, posters, exhibitions – far too numerous to detail – vilify the Bahá’ís and their religion. In many localities, slogans spray-painted in and around Bahá’í cemeteries, houses, shops, orchards and vehicles include slander such as: “Bahá’ís – mercenaries of Israel”, “Death to Bahá’ís, the mercenaries of America and England”, and “Bahá’ís are Najes [unclean]). These lies

23 These discussions took place at the ILO Conference sitting on 15 June 2006. The proceedings can be accessed at (see bottom of page 41 to page 44):

24 The 2009 Conference segment on Iran can be found in the Provisional Record at:
http://www.ilo.org/global/What_we_do/Officialmeetings/ilc/ILCSessions/98thSession/pr/lang--en/docName--WCMS_108378/index.htm see pp. 99-106. The relevant extracts are provided in attachment to the printed copy of this submission, see Annex 21.

25 Photos of a few of these are provided as separate annexes to the printed copy of this submission.
are also widely distributed in anti-Bahá’í letters and pamphlets. The language used is clearly inspired by State-sanctioned media that have distorted history, used fake documents and grossly maligned Bahá’í moral principles on innumerable occasions.

Defamatory articles have appeared regularly for the past six years in Kayhan, one of the oldest daily newspapers in Iran, which is managed by a representative of the Supreme Leader at the Kayhan Institute. Extracts from the Kayhan articles later appeared in other newspapers, on anti-Bahá’í websites and in books.

We are particularly concerned about this because of violent attacks and incidents (reported above) where Bahá’í children and adolescents were subjected to abuse based on slanderous accusations. Members of the community across Iran receive threatening telephone calls, text messages and anonymous letters. These contain the malicious slander appearing in media linked to the government.

As the community is prohibited from using any means of communication with the public, the Bahá’ís have not been able to counter the calumnies coming from those who provide the Iranian people with guidance in spiritual matters. It is of particular concern that the government blocks all Bahá’í websites, whether originating from within or outside Iran, thus depriving Bahá’ís of this most effective means of providing their fellow Iranians with accurate information on the Bahá’í Faith.

### 10. Conclusion

Outside Iran, the persecution against the Bahá’ís is repeatedly denounced by the international community (the United Nations, intergovernmental bodies and civil society) when condemning Iranian government violations of international human rights standards. For over 20 years, the UN General Assembly has adopted resolutions that include references to violations against minorities in Iran, including the Bahá’ís. Since 2005, half a dozen UN Special Procedures have reported the upsurge in oppressive acts detailed above,26 many of which were also mentioned in the report on human rights in Iran submitted by the UN Secretary General to the General Assembly in September 2009.27 The Iranian government has responded with either silence or lies.

We are gravely concerned about the steady increase, over the past six years, in the arbitrary and cruel use of power against the Bahá’ís in Iran. The nature, number and range of incidents give ample evidence of underlying official policy, putting members of the community under severe pressure, attempting to disengage them from their friends and fellow citizens, intimidating people they know and inciting the population to detest and distrust them.

In a statement made in Canada’s Senate on 16 June 2010, the Honourable Senator Roméo Dallaire drew attention to the persecution of the Bahá’ís of Iran as “a most serious situation”, noting that, “As a member of the United Nations’ Secretary-General’s Advisory Committee

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26 Since 2005, human rights violations against Iranian Bahá’ís have been mentioned in documents submitted to the UN Human Rights Council by the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, the Independent Expert on minority issues, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression.

on Genocide Prevention, I can say that there is no clearer example of a nation leading its way into a potential genocide scenario. It is meeting all the criteria.”

The Iranian Bahá’ís deeply love their homeland, despite all the suffering they have endured under successive regimes. They are heartened by growing support among the general populace in defence of their rights (most recently exemplified by an Iranian living in the country who has courageously launched a weblog in defence of the Bahá’ís). The members of this community seek the freedom to serve their country and humankind, at the prompting of the principles and teachings of their Faith. Regardless of the restrictions imposed on them, they do not refrain from discharging their spiritual and social responsibilities. They continue to strive, through their participation in constructive discourse with their neighbours, co-workers, friends and acquaintances, to play an important role in the progress of their nation.